I have to apologize for the inexcusably light posting. I am at a residency in Finland, rethinking my approach to writing, including this project. When I’m back in September, I hope to return to a more regular posting schedule, with some thematic and other adjustments. In the meantime, I wanted to share a few things I’ve published recently.
In the new Tribune, edited by the great Oliver Eagleton, I have a piece out about populism in Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. I began with a question that some might consider provocative: what are the real conditions that supporters of the region’s “right-wing populists” are responding to? My answer was by no means an original one, but essential, I think, for understanding recent regional politics: that supporters of Orbán, Fico, and Georgescu (along with other Romanian populists, of which there are many) are responding in part to disappointments with liberal democracy. For the region’s industrial workers, the post-1989 transition to capitalism and democracy did not usher in a new era of prosperity but rather immiseration and a loss of status. They therefore nursed resentment towards liberalism and often, its administrators in the EU. Of course, I don’t claim that post-communist resentment is the only element at play here, but I think it’s important and real.
I know some of you who’ve been reading my Substack for a while might look at this piece and think, “but Lily, I thought you said that populism was dead?” Well, that’s not really what I said. I was straw manned by a few people who claimed I said that populism had been vanquished. To be fair, it kind of serves me right, since I gave a post the title “Requiem for a Populist Decade”. Honestly, I just liked the way it sounded. What I actually said was that Orban’s loss in the most recent Hungarian elections hinted at a fatigue with MAGA populism, and that Trump was becoming an albatross for the European right (this in the wake of his threats to annex Greenland and the start of the war on Iran). I wrote that populism, as a strategy, tends to produce diminishing returns over time, and must mutate to survive.
However, it’s not only the “populists” who’ve mutated. In this week’s excellent Ideas Letter, my colleague Hans Kundnani has an essay titled “Obfuscations of Populism”. Kundnani argues that the center-right has adopted many of the far-right’s policy positions (e.g. on immigration), and has mobilized the “populist” label to differentiate and distance themselves from the far-right. This has allowed for the mainstreaming of far-right politics under the guise of “sensible” centrist technocracy. I think this is a great intervention into the discussion of populism.
The second piece I’m sharing was produced after attending this year’s NATO summit in Ankara. These very expensive annual meetings are now held largely to ensure that Trump remains onside and to rally the dejected troops into a sense of transient unity. The latter entails disseminating talking points to journalists who are then expected to repeat them without much critical thought.
At this year’s summit, I sat in the basement of Erdoğan’s vast Presidential Complex and listened as a senior NATO official described alleged cracks in the Kremlin matrix. The new line was that spectacular Ukrainian drone strikes inside Russian territory had not only “turned the tide” in Ukraine’s favor, but were probably prompting segments of the Russian elite to turn away from Putin. I found this fascinating. I don’t discount the spectacular nature of Ukrainian drone strikes, or doubt at all that there is fatigue with the war in Russia. But the fundamentals of the conflict have not changed–Russia has Ukraine vastly outmanned–and the idea that Putin might be overthrown soon struck me as completely delusional. I wrote about my discomfort with the narrative for New Left Review’s Sidecar, with generous support from the Alameda Institute (special shout out to Benjamin Fogel). The other point I made was that while Kremlinologist types look for fissures in the Russian elite, there were very serious divisions opening up in Ukraine.
This became impossible to ignore with Zelenskyy’s dismissal of Palantir-backed tech wunderkind Mykhailo Fedorov from the position of defense minister last month. The decision triggered protests in major cities and calls for Fedorov’s reinstatement. Earlier this week, Fedorov went so far as to demand elections, provoking backlash from erstwhile supporters who say that it would be impossible to organize a vote in wartime Ukraine…
…Anyway, I suppose I should just let you read them for yourself. See you in September.




